The essay starts from the assumption that the efforts to cure Europe's 
The intensity of the debate on these issues is an indicator of their importance and this importance is uncontested. Does this imply that the efforts to cure the "democracy deficit" of the integration project will remain deficient if they fail to overcome Europe's "social deficit"? It is one thing to agree with such a suggestion: it is quite another to identify an adequate theoretical framework in which the constitutional discourse can, and should, address it. The effort that this essay undertakes rests upon three interdependent (bundles of) premises.
The first: constitutionalism must reach down into the economic system and the social fabric of society. If it fails to do so, it loses its democratic credentials. This strong statement needs much explanation. Three references need to be given: one historical precedent is the 1 debate within the Staatsarechtslehre of the Weimar Republic 3 Not at the core, but significant, too, were the ideas of Wirtschaftsdemokratie (economic democracy) and Sozialverfassung (social constitution) as promoted by Franz Neumann, Hugo Sinzheimer, and Ernst Fraenkel. 4 All this was taken up after World War II under the new German constitution. 5 
Just a
Sonderweg of German constitutional theory? Certainly more than that. The tensions between law and social justice and its "juridification" are of general importance. 6 And to take the argument a step further into an uncharted sea: this debate is linked to the project of modernity itself: to the tension and conflict "between the project of political modernity defined as Cf., the Special Issue of the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence on Social Democracy (Guest Editor: Colin Harvey); to cite just one contributor: R. Burchill, "The EU and European Democracy -Social Democracy or Democracy with a Social Dimension?", 185 ff, 186 argues: "In addressing the 'wider issues' of democracy, we are taken beyond the political sphere to engage with the social and economic organisation of society. Once we move in this direction, agreement about the nature, scope and content of democracy becomes very contentious. If the overall purpose of democracy is "to provide the conditions for the full and free development of the essential human capacities of all the members of the society" [referring to M Loughlin, "Rights, Democracy, and Law" in T. Campbell, K. Ewing and A. Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights, Oxford 1992, 42 ff.]. He goes on ".…[D]emocracy needs to be something more than the existence of a few basic political procedures. By bringing the idea of 'social' into the frame, we then begin to address the wider issues by incorporating the social and economic aspects of society into our understanding of democracy. However, as this involves making normative claims in relation to democracy, it is widely felt that this stretches the understanding of democracy too far". And there is even more continuity with Weimar scholarship: "Constitutionalisation" has become a quest which affects ever more spheres of "secondary" law, including private law and under the label of "societal constitutionalism". See G. Teubner, "Societal Constitutionalism. Alternatives to State-centred Constitutional Theory?", in Ch. Joerges, I.-J. Sand and G. Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, Oxford 2004, 3 ff. Continuity in the discussion of the tensions between the political objectives of social democracy and the rule of law in liberal democracies seems particularly relevant in the context of this paper. However, it is clear that it does not cover the relationship between constitutionalism and society comprehensively and that it fails to specify the reasons for the deepening of the interest in a "European social model". What is true for both these traditions and the notion of an "economic constitution" applies, of course, also to "economic law". This term cannot be adequately translated into English, as neither its ordo-liberal nor its critical understanding -represented by titles such as Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts ("economic law as critique of private law"), H.-D. Assmann, G. Brüggemeier, D. Hart and Ch. Joerges, Königstein/Ts. 1980) have an equivalent in the English speaking world; cf., very briefly, Ch. Joerges, "Economic Law, the Nation-State and the Maastricht Treaty", in R. Dehousse (ed.), Europe after Maastricht: an Ever Closer Union?, Munich 1994, 29 ff., 30-32. collective self-determination, and economic modernity defined as the autonomous determination of the ways in which human needs are satisfied". 7 The second premise can be explained by a reference "Economy and Society", Max Weber's famous notion and project of a social theory which includes sociology of law. This type of a sociologically informed jurisprudence is under-represented the agenda of European constitutionalists. The law of the economy, of industrial relations, and the ever deeper involvement of the European Union with social policy 8 did not, of course, go unnoticed. But these matters were handed over to the experts of the fields that were under scrutiny. 9 The Theory of the European Economic Constitution to which the title of this essay alludes is a great exception. This theory is a truly constitutional response in its crafting of the interdependence of the Rechtsstaat, the ordering of the European economy, and the assignment of social policy to the nation states. In this way, the Theory of the European Economic Constitution has contributed to the decoupling (Scharpf) 10 of social policy from the European project.
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This normative objection is, however, linked to a more "sociological" critique. The theory's potential to guide the European project is exhausted, and the efforts to revive it have failed or are bound to be unsuccessful.
In an important sense, however, the exhaustion of the economic constitution is a mixed blessing. To anticipate the thesis which Section IV of this essay will defend: the erosion of the economic constitution did not pave the way to "social Europe" or to the reconstruction of a European social democracy. Neither the commitments of the Constitutional Treaty to a "social market economy" nor the new social rights or the turn to "new modes of governance" are really trustworthy and highly ambivalent. In particular, the "Open Method of Co-ordination" threatens the very idea of constitutionalism, namely, the idea of law mediated, and rule-of-law bound governance. This argument is based on a third premise which is "conservative" in that it insists that European "governance" practices must not take the rule of law lightly.
In the elaboration of this three dimensional theoretical framework, this essay will take a reconstructive approach. The following section will first point to the origins of the theory of the economic constitution, and explain its specific notion of constitutionalism (II.1). It will then deal with the transformation of this theoretical heritage in post World War II Germany into the "social market economy" (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) (II.2). The concluding part of this section will seek to explain why the theory of the economic constitution provided such an attractive design for the formative era of the European integration project. It will, however, be added that the importation of this theory into the European project came at a price. It prepared the ground for Europe's "social deficit", which remains so difficult to overcome (II.3).
The leading proponents of this approach had fundamentally renewed their theoretical basis by the 1960s and 1970s, in such a way that they seemed well prepared for the new dynamics of European integration in the 1980s (Section III.1). However, the new dynamics and the striving for an "ever closer Union" in the Maastricht Treaty led to a strengthening of European regulatory policies and a broadening of their scope, both of which were no longer compatible with the traditional and the renewed theoretical design (III.2). The support of the theory of the economic constitution which the German Constitutional Court's Maastricht judgment provided has proved to be a pyrrhic victory. The political constraints which this judgment confirmed damaged the economic viability of Europe and deepened the schism between national social models striving and institutionalized Europe (Section III.3).
The turn to new modes of governance presents itself as the most important remedy, which, thanks to the European Convention, even became a candidate for constitutionalization.
However, the account submitted in Section IV will not be so positive.
There is not much left of the Economic Constitution and there is not much of it which is Left, either. But, this resume is not to announce an exercise in deconstruction. Throughout the whole essay a background agenda will be pursued in each of its sections, which seek to reveal another dimension of the integration process. To indicate at least the perspective: markets, so the theory of the economic constitution argues, are not self-sustaining, they need institutional backing. Yes, but markets are social institutions which cannot be governed through some objective mechanism and do not simply respond to some functional needs -they are, in the last instance, "polities". The opening of our national economies (Volkswirtschaften) requires responses, on the one hand, to the erosion of the political powers of the nation state, and, on the other, to the risks of unaccountable transnational governance arrangements. It is the great merit of the theory of the European economic constitution to have addressed this challenge. Its responses, however, remained one-dimensionally restricted to an institutionalization of economic rationality criteria at transnational levels of governance. The post-national constellations in which we find ourselves require more complex and socially more sensitive responses to the tensions between the opening of formerly national economies and the prerequisites of social solidarity. Such answers are not readily available. They need to be discovered in reflective practices -and Europe's constitutionalization need, therefore, to be conceptualized as a process, in which Law has to supervise and to discipline the practices of governance.
II. What is an Economic Constitution?
It is -or should have become -impossible to use the term constitutional law without reflecting the theoretical yardsticks which are invoked to assign specific functions and justify specific validity claims of "constitutional" norms. It is hence insufficient to point to the supremacy doctrine, direct effect, or the resistance to change on the part of core elements of European law, to characterize them as constitutional.
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This kind of definition is particularly popular among European lawyers, because it allows them to talk about a European constitution without discussing discrepancies with the juridification of political processes, institutional states, or the democracy deficits of European governance practices. The use of the word constitution in relation to European economic law is, then, nothing spectacular. But it is also empty because such a notion does not inform us about the validity claims of the economic constitution, let alone, its (normative) legitimacy.
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This, and nothing less, is the promise and the aspiration of the theory of the economic constitution, and only because of these ambitions can it claim constitutional status.
In order to understand these ambitions, we have to take a detour and a glance, first, at the origins, and, then, at the development of our notion. 
The Social Market Economy: An Economical Christian Project
But this is an anticipation of some of the aspects and developments to which we will have to return.
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More important for the impact of Ordo-liberalism in post-war Germany is another dimension, which Philip Manow has carved out in a series of fascinating studies.
27
The social question which generated so much unrest in early capitalism was a challenge to the Christian churches, and the institutional varieties of European welfarism mirrored religious affinities. This is not major news concerning political Catholicism. But the story which Manow recounts about the importance of social Protestantism is new, 28 and this is of particular importance for the students of the "economic constitution". "Ordo" is a Catholic notion. Yet, the Ordo-liberals who embraced it -Walter Eucken, Alexander Rüstow, Wilhelm Röpke -were all strongly linked to Protestantism.
29
What both the Protestants and the Catholics sought was a third way between capitalism and socialism -and this alliance was the underpinning of Germany's postwar social market economy; this was their ecumenical project and became the common project of the Protestants and the Catholics in the Christian Democratic Union.
The Economic Constitution: "Authoritarian Liberalism" Revisited?
The alliance of churches, political Protestantism and Catholicism in the early post-war years extended itself to the trade unions -Germany's social market economy was their common project and became a political, social and economic success. Catholicism against economic liberalism resurfaced, and the old alliances between Catholicism, economic corporatism and Bismarckian welfarism were rebuilt. 31 The Protestant Ordo-liberals did not appreciate this restoration of patterns which looked all too similar to what they had tried to overcome back in the 1920s. And now, in the new Bonn Republic, they had another prestigious standing. The group had grown and its views dominated a good deal of academic life, public opinion, and the officious communications of the Christian Democratic government. Confidently and coherently, Ordo-liberalism revitalized its programme. A core element of its constitutional messages and perspectives was the theory of the "economic constitution", the thesis that the constitution should respect the interdependence of a system of undistorted competition, individual freedoms and the rule of law -and protect this precious balance against discretionary political influence. The real existing compromise, a Wirtschaftsverfassung with strong corporatist elements, the economic democracy aspirations in political Catholicism and the reconstruction of the Bismarckian welfare state under the Catholic Chancellor Adenauer were anathema to the leading Ordo-liberals. They saw Germany again "on the road to serfdom". And, indeed, their institutional agenda, on which the quest for strong bodies dedicated to the defence of free competition and insulated from both the pluralism of interest groups and governmental political insinuations ranked so highly, was very often frustrated in Germany's Verhandlungsdemokratie. 40 Thus, it is small wonder that they embraced the integration project, framework conditions for a market economic system (at least to the degree that the many departures from the system might be classified as exceptions, and a blind eye could be (had to be!) turned to the original sin of the Common Agricultural Policy. The fact that Europe had started its integrationist path as a mere economic community lent plausibility to ordo-liberal arguments -and even required them: in the ordo-liberal account, the Community acquired a legitimacy of its own by interpreting its pertinent provisions as prescribing a law-based order committed to guaranteeing economic freedoms and protecting competition by supranational institutions. This legitimacy was independent of the state's democratic constitutional institutions. By the same token, it imposed limits upon the Community: discretionary economic policies seemed illegitimate and unlawful. European polity has a twofold structure: at supranational level, it is committed to economic rationality and a system of undistorted competition. At national level, re-distributive (social) policies may be pursued and developed further.
To summarize: Europe was constituted as a dual polity. Its "economic constitution" was un-political in the sense that it was not subject to political interventions. This was its constitutional-supranational raison d'être. Social policy was treated as a categorically distinct subject. It was a/the? domain of political legislation and, thus, had to remain national. The social embeddedness of the market could, and should, be accomplished by the Member States in differentiated ways -and, for a decade or so, the balance seemed stable. 
"Invasions of the Market"?
The Commission's Internal Market initiative could be interpreted as an effort to strengthen and prioritize the institutionalization of economic rationality in the integration project. The legal and policy implications of the revised theoretical framework were spelled out in great detail, first at national, but soon also at European level. However, these implications cannot be dealt with here. The second generation is, at any rate, in one important sense, faithful to the ordo-liberal tradition. The framework within which the integration project is supposed to develop further is un-political in that it is not subjected to political debate or deliberation. This framework again seeks to institutionalize economic liberties and economic rationality. so more flexibly, but also more comprehensively than was originally envisaged by the ordoliberal school. It therefore deserves to be called an "economic constitution".
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The hopes that leading exponents of the school articulated corresponded to the expectations that many critics had retained of the new orientation of the integration project.
This schism between proponents and opponents forms part of a wider debate concerning the benefits and the costs of market governance.
56
This debate is, of course, relevant for an assessment of the 1992 project. But it is not "directly applicable", simply because the implementation of this project disappointed the hopes of its proponents as much as it did not confirm the anxieties of its critics. What had started out as a collective effort to strengthen Europe's competitiveness and accomplish this objective through new (de-regulatory) strategies soon led to the entanglement of the EU in ever more policy fields and the development of ever more sophisticated regulatory machinery.
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It was, in particular, the concern of the European legislation and the Commission with "social regulation" (health and safety of consumers and workers, and environmental protection) which proved to be irrefutable. The weight and dynamics of these policy fields had been thoroughly underestimated by the proponents of the "economic constitution". What remains true, however, is that the protagonists of the "economic constitution" have remained silent and thereby contributed to the devaluation of their approach.
Erosions of the Market?
The praise of the Internal Market Programme was not to last long: the preparation and adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, widely perceived as a deepening and consolidation of the integration project, met with fierce criticism.
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The reasons are manifold and -within the (neo)-ordo-liberal theoretical framework -are comprehensible and conclusive. How can one continue to assign a constitutive function to the "system of undistorted competition", when the promotion of that system is only one among many other competing objectives, and its relative weight has to be determined in political processes? 60 How can one reconcile the commitment to competition as the discovery procedure in economic affairs with the acknowledgement of industrial policy as a constitutionally legitimated concern? The Maastricht Treaty was the end of the "economic constitution". From then onwards, the ordo-liberal school redefined itself as an oppositional movement.
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This is not to say that its adherents would have given up their cause. Quite to the contrary. They continued to develop the approach further and to explore all the possibilities of strengthening its (now relative) weight and impact.
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The turn was one from self-confident identification with the integration project to a critique of its course.
Rules versus Politics? Monetary Union, the Maastricht Judgment and the Stability Pact
A grand opportunity to promote the ordo-liberal cause seemed to arise in the context of the objections against the Maastricht Treaty, which were brought to the Constitutional Court in Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht). How was this achieved and why did hardly anybody notice it? The essential paradox in the Court's reasoning is readily apparent. True, the Bundesverfassungsgericht called it a constitutional "must" that the German Parliament retained "essential" competencies. But then the Court took an argumentative turn which was, in its substance, strictly ordo-liberal: economic integration was qualified as a non-political phenomenon occurring autonomously outside the Member States. All Monetary Union needed was a functional legitimacy based upon the institutionally guarantied commitment to price stability and provisions against excessive fiscal deficits. With such an institutional design, the Court concluded, economic integration would not be exposed to further questioning of its democratic legitimacy. To put it slightly differently: Europe could remain a "market without a state" while its sub-units, once called the "Masters of the Treaties" (Herren der Verträge) would be downgraded to "states without markets".
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This reading is obviously inspired by the interpretative framework used in this essay.
Outside Germany (and also inside Germany in the public law factions of European scholarship), the paradoxical side of the Court's argument went unnoticed. Instead, the Bundesverfassungsgericht's defence of nation state democracies was blamed as echoing Schmittian ideas. 66 Even if this were so, the point underlined here seems more critical. The Court's reasoning implied that Germany was, as a matter of its constitutional law, barred from joining the monetary union, unless all of Europe subscribed to Germany's monetary philosophy. 65 Ch. Joerges, "States without a Market. Comments on the German Constitutional Court's Maastricht-Judgment and a Plea for Interdisciplinary Discourses", NISER Working-Paper, Utrecht, 1996, also at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-020.htm. Clearly, one has to ask how serious the Court wanted to be taken when imposing these restraints. "Not too literally" is the answer one can infer from the Bundesverfassungsgericht's response to the subsequent complaint against the entry into the third pase of There is little reason to be proud of the imposition of ordo-liberal concepts on the rest of Europe. There is much more reason to believe that this was only, and at best, a pyrrhic victory. In terms of economic policy and political democracy, the most problematical aspect of the 1992 amendments concern fiscal policy. They seek to ensure a budgetary reasonableness/rationale? not through a political process but through "juridification", namely, holds such an opinion. One of the mild formulae he uses is that the 3% "numerical threshold is not well grounded in theory".
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At times, his language is stronger.
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However, he is just one economist among many. What is uncontroversial, however, is the "fact" that there is controversy about the reasonableness/rationale? of the rules that the Member States have signed.
Lawyers are not supposed to examine the reasons, but are supposed to obey authorities, Immanuel Kant once remarked somewhat sarcastically.
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In a field so strongly infiltrated by 67 See his "Should the Maastricht Treaty be Saved?" (Princeton studies in international finance no. 74), Princeton, NJ 1992. 68 In his Working Paper PEIF-6 on "Institutions for Fiscal Stability", which he prepared for the Munich Economic Summit of 2-3 May, 2003. 69 A harsher one: the "3 percent ceiling is at best silly and at worst perverse" -which he wrote in a contribution to DIE ZEIT of 20 November 2003. 70 Immanuel Kant, "The Contest of Faculties", in Kant: Political Writings (Hans Reiss, ed., 2 nd ed. 1991).
non-legal expert knowledge and so difficult to programme in advance by sound and stable criteria, there are other reasons for being cautious about taking decisions qua law.
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Would institutional actors be well advised not to search for legal answers?
That is a question which the ECJ had to deal with in a recent judgment. 74 Case C-27/04, paras. 9-10. 75 Case C-27/04, paras. 11-12. 76 Case C-27/04, para. 20. 77 Cf., the Bundesverfassungsgericht's cautious, if not evasive, response to the "four professors" asking it to examine the legality of the Community's allegedly much too lax application of the Maastricht convergence criteria (see Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 97, 350 and note 65 supra).
actors had attached to it.
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It observed that it was simply not legally foreseen in the pertinent provisions to hold procedures "in abeyance" and concluded that "the Council's conclusions adopted in respect of the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany respectively must … be annulled in so far as they contain a decision to hold the excessive deficit procedure in abeyance and a decision modifying the recommendations previously adopted by the Council under Article 104(7) EC".
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It also underlined, however, that the Council has "a discretion" and that "it may, in particular on the basis of a different assessment of the relevant economic data, of the measures to be taken and of the timetable to be met by the Member State concerned, Eichengreen at the beginning of the controversy. Compliance with it would further damage the German economy, in particular. This would not be in the European interest. Who knows that?
Maybe, we lawyers should not take responsibility for decision-making in which we risk discrediting the law. 87 The constitutional risk inherent in a misconceived "juridification" of monetary and fiscal policy responsibilities is to create a vacuum in which political actors cannot be held accountable and the very idea of law-mediated legitimacy gets destroyed. 88 The sad concluding message is that the Maastricht Treaty and the Maastricht judgment were a pyrrhic victory for a twofold reason: (1) Maastricht confirmed the decoupling of the social from the economic constitution thereby deepening Europe's social deficit. (2) Rather than establishing the supremacy of law over monetary and fiscal policy, Maastricht has "dejuridified" the economic constitution -and now it seems that the effort to cure the social deficit has run into the same trap. dedicated to knowledge society issues and to setting very ambitious goals for Europe in pertinent industries. However, it also renewed the agenda of "social Europe" and tried to turn what, until then, had been perceived as a deficit, namely, the lack of genuine European competences and the unavailability of the traditional "Community method", into a virtue. The OMC, so Jonathan Zeitlin argues, promises to be: "an attractive model of how a non-coercive form of policy co-ordination emphasizing mutual learning and exchange of good practices could be applied to a politically sensitive field such as social protection which is characterized by wide institutional variations across EU Member States, where harmonization is considered by many to be neither practicable nor desirable".
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A European Employment Strategy was the first objective. Employment is a pressing problem in so many European states. At the European level of governance, it cannot be directly addressed with the means that the Union has at its disposal. But it can be discussed, nonbinding objectives substantiated, and guidelines offered. These recommendations can then be adapted in the Member States to their specific contexts. This type of implementation cannot be subjected to the controls through which the Community seeks to ensure compliance with its legislative frameworks and policies. But the activities at Member State level can be "benchmarked" and evaluated. The accompanying hope is that this will open chances for mutual learning and better performance.
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The OMC approach has since been applied to other areas, such as social inclusion and pensions. It has even become something like a Leitbild on the political Left.
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It has also attracted much attention in the Convention Process. The final report of Working Group VI on "Economic Governance" stated: "The Working Group considers that the Open Method of Coordination has proved to be a useful instrument in policy areas where no stronger co-ordination 91 J. Zeitlin, "Comments on Jacobsson and Vifell, Employment Policy Co-ordination: Between Deliberation and Discipline?", Ms. Madison,WI 2004. 92 As was underlined on the Lisbon summit, the OMC procedure is "a fully decentralised approach" which can be applied "in line with the principle of subsidiarity"; the Union, the Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the social partners and civil society can and should be actively involved, using response to the dilemmas of national welfare state politics, and design our research agendas accordingly. We should analyse its potential to "re-calibrate" social policies in a more flexible, participatory, experimental mode and to accomplish this objective as a multi-level governance system. 98 The OMC, we read in a recent paper, will "create transnational expertise networks that: transmit new ways of thinking about social policy across borders; broaden participation in such transnational policy networks to ensure legitimacy and effectiveness; merge technical insight with practical knowledge and new normative visions; combine a problem-solving technical approach with participatory deliberation; facilitate lower level experiments; produce learning through decentralized experimentation, wide-spread bench-marking, exchange of best practices, and peer review; bring various policy worlds together; foster public-private cooperation; and avoid a race to the bottom via multi-lateral surveillance and shaming", adding ,
however, that such claims must be "subjected to rigorous testing". 
Normative Queries
It is difficult not to agree with such an understanding of the OMC. And yet, we must consider the risks that we run once this machinery is set in motion. This is, in particular, Claus Offe's disquieting objection: 100 The OMC has effects, but not the promised ones. It will instead destroy the non-Anglo-Saxon modes of welfarism in Europe. How should the Law know? But it is by no means exceptional for lawyers and law to be confronted with contests over issues they do not understand and with uncertainties over the implications of their decisions. They should, therefore, understand their task of designing responses to such difficulties. The OMC is an institution designed to find, not to implement, solutions. Is it a good design?
Democratic Experimentalism?
The theoretical background on which the advocates of the OMC rely has been developed outside European frameworks. 101 The have then be tried out in American administrative law, 102 before they were presented in Europe 103 and the merger with OMC occurred. 104 It is important to remember that the whole approach of democratic experimentalism received its inspirations from a societal sphere, which European constitutionalism tends to treat with (un)benign neglect, namely, the organizational practices of private business. In a daring and fascinating move, 105 Charles Sabel and his followers have applied the lessons to be learnt from the Japanese variety of capitalism about their practices of benchmarking, the need to adapt to incessant change, 106 the commitment to permanent experimentation, an interest and a readiness in mutual learning from independent monitoring, the establishment of systems of measurement and evaluation, etc., to administrative bodies, and argued that their regulatory practices should follow these examples from economy and society. Democratic experimentalists promise that "a successful institutionalization of the principles of benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and independent monitoring allows us to tackle volatility and diversity best" -not just within firms. 107 At first sight, this message might look like a strange loop which begins in the public sphere, then goes into the private realm, and then brings messages from there to its point of departure. Have we not all been taught to use all sorts of legal instruments -company law, antitrust, and economic regulation -to tame private enterprise? Why is there such a widely felt need to extend the reach of fundamental rights into the private sphere if private governance develops superior qualities, anyway? Are all the quests for a constitutionalization of the subconstitutional spheres of the legal system and the search for a "societal constitutionalism"
superfluous.
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In an ironic sense, democratic experimentalism can be called a methodological heir to first generation Ordo-liberalism. It invokes qualities inherent in the economic sphere as a yardstick that public governance should respect and internalize; and the affinities with the Hayekian discovery procedure may seem even stronger because von Hayek has substituted the strong state of the ordo-liberals by the smoother governance of general legal rules. 109 These affinities are, however, very limited. Whereas Ordo-liberalism sought to protect the ordo of the economy through a strong state which would rigorously enforce laws against restrictive business practices and abuse of private power, democratic experimentalism is relying on political processes, softer modes of co-ordination and the subtle power of transparency and exposure to public critique. And, in contrast to the Hayekian discovery process, the proposals to "institutionalize" democratic experimentalism invoke the imagination not just of entrepreneurs and market participants but also of deliberating political citizens, and trust in their readiness to engage in problem-solving and in their interest to learn from one another.
"Sweet melodies", to be sure. The question, however, of whether we should listen to them and trust "a law so 'soft' to be no law at all"? 110 This soft supranational power may not be so innocent, opines Alexander Somek. The "new modes of governance", he observes, "are marked by two characteristics: first, they are informal in that they are based on informationgathering, the drawing up of 'action-plans', the allocation of public praise for 'best practice' and the shaming of under-achievers; second, even though they have been designed for special policy areas, they are nonetheless 'holistic', which means, in the words of the European Commission, that they commit 'Governments as a whole, as well as a wide range of stakeholders'. A diffuse soft power is exercising its hold without being constrained by the norms which govern competence allocation. 111 Amstutz on a systems theory basis. His concern is the law's proprium, namely, its function and task to respond to conflicts which cannot be resolved in the societal sub-systems in which they originate. 112 In a discourse theory version, what may function at the level of local "government councils" will be much more difficult to achieve when experimentalists meet with national, European and international standardization bodies, 113 or face administrators who are keen to promote the institutional prestige and power of their organisations, or welfare bureaucracies which seek to defend their own practices and/or the political interests of their superiors. Can we really believe that arrangements will be found, implemented and sustained, in which stakeholders engage with sufficient intensity and continuity in the definition and discussion of their concerns so that legitimacy can be said to rest on the deliberative processes of all the affected parties. Democratic experimentalism asks us to take the traditional virtues of the rule of law lightly. It asks us to loosen the ties between law and enforcement, and, instead, to trust that our societies will manage with much less governmental powers. But it does not tell us how we might find the post-national criteria that will enable and legitimate a "benchmarking" of national experiences, histories, and aspirations. It fails to explain how the insights that the exposure to the experiences of others might lead to co-ordinated policies and how they might be implemented against unconvinced opponents. More importantly, it fails to address the risks that its own implementation in the EU entails. There is nothing wrong with bureaucracies and experts exchanging experiences and learning about new possibilities. There is a great deal wrong with building up opaque networks which get entrusted with the task of seeking to carry through what they have learned or agreed upon in democratic societies. Such a model of governance may be soft because it no longer relies on mandatory provisions. It is, for the same reason, strong because it risks empowering the executive and removing the virtues of democratic accountability, of rule-bound public governance and its judicial control. 114 we, by taking the rule of law so lightly, promote but executive governance instead of deliberate polyarchy?
W.E. Scheuerman has complemented these sceptical queries by a sociological observation. He summarizes one key assumption of democratic experimentalism as the assertion "that we increasingly encounter evidence of diversity in terms of local conditions and regulatory needs". He confronts this claim with the tendencies of "high-speed" capitalism "to compress and even 'annihilate' geographical space or distance. High-speed social activity dramatically heightens the possibilities for interaction across both geographical and the existing political divides, opening the door to historically unprecedented opportunities for simultaneity and instantaneousness in human experience".
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Democratic experimentalists, he continues, fail "to provide an adequate place in their theory, in both normative and institutional terms, for those facets of contemporary social experience poorly captured by its repeated references to local diversity in social conditions". 
Bringing the Eighties Back In?
The turn to soft governance in the EU and the turn away from the very idea of law-mediated governance are risky. And it seems that this risk is not really necessary. It may be an all too hasty disregard of the alternatives that were elaborated decades ago. The intense debates of the 1970s about the failures of welfare-state juridification strategies were guided by normative concerns about the intrusion of bureaucratic machineries into the economy and the life-world.
It was the broadly experienced disappointment with "purposive" legal programmes and a new sensitivity towards "intrusions into the life-world" through a juridification of social policy goals that triggered the search for models of legal rationality that would fill the gaps left open by formalist legal techniques, and, at the same time, cure the failures of the law's grip on social reality on the basis of some "grand theory" (such as economic theories of law, systems theory or discourse theories). 117 "Proceduralisation" and "reflexive law" were, at the same time, concerned with very practical matters, namely, the problems of implementation and compliance. Discrepancies between legal programmes -especially between "purposive" legislation designed to achieve specific objectives and the actual impact of such laws on society -were a core concern of legal sociology, of effectiveness and implementation research. 118 The normative and the pragmatic critique of purposive programmes and of command-and-control regulation have motivated a search for alternatives such as selfregulation and soft law. Such strategies responded to the same concerns that the proponents of the OMC now invoke. But they sought to keep the rule of law alive.
V. A Resumé
So much for the critique. And what has the critic to offer instead? The law is a normative exercise; the whole discipline is engaged in the production of valid answers which distinguish between the legal and the illegal, and equate this distinction with justice as opposed to injustice. Ambivalent messages are not particularly welcome and are difficult to endure.
And yet, the uncertainties of the state of the (European) Union may require exactly that -at least, if lawyers seek to take up the three issues denoted in the introduction: 119 Does the constitutionalization of Europe reach out into the "Economy and Society"? Are there alternatives to the OMC alternative to the exhausted economic constitution? Can we ensure that European governance remains rule-bound and its legitimacy continues to be meditated by law?
The Constitutional Treaty
The obvious first object is to look for answers to these questions in the new Constitutional 
Constitutionalization as Process
"L'éssentiel est invisible pour les yeux", is comfort that Antoine de Saint Exupéry's Petit Prince give us. What is not so visible, because it seems so unexciting and trivial, is the performance of the European machinery, the innumerable, small and not so small, indicators of good European governance. Europeanization is an instigator of countless innovative projects.
Directly behind or lying in the shadow of grand designs, such as that of the theory of the economic constitution or directly-deliberative polyarchy, there is another Europe at work. It is not so easy to discover, not so coherent, and often ambivalent. But we can approach it in three steps: (1) one is analytical and interdisciplinary. We have some well-discussed and elaborated hypotheses about the structures of the European multi-level system of governance and the conceptualisation of this system in legal categories; (2) the second step concerns our experiences with and insights into the Europeanization processes. Nobody can claim to know and understand the complex processes of Europeanization in their entirety. But if one studies some of them in some depth, one will discover patterns of change in both successful learning processes and in failures.
130
The "law of the European economy" which becomes visible in such endeavours is very different -and much more interesting -than the law in the books. 129 See G. 
